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Tax Incentives and Sub-Saharan Africa
Karen B. Brown

Abstract
The OECD’s Base Erosion Profit Shifting (BEPS) project has taken a
powerful and welcome look at many of the tax avoidance strategies that
proliferate in a world where multinational enterprises are in the business of
exploiting gaps in the tax laws of different countries to minimize their ultimate
tax bills. The focus on international consensus and prescriptions for reform
has not been an unqualified good for the nations in Sub-Saharan Africa, which
find themselves in the position of reacting to standards and taking on
compliance burdens set without sufficient consideration of their special
circumstances. Because the path for the BEPS project was chosen before
receiving meaningful input from these nations, the initiatives offer little
support for revenue-raising strategies for Sub-Saharan Africa and require an
administrative infrastructure currently beyond the capacity of many nations
in the region. With an eye toward integrating achievement of the United
Nations Sustainable Development Goals (2030) (SDGs) with the BEPS
project, this article urges three reforms: implementation of treaty-based
regional tax incentives mindful of the SDGs in the OECD’s Multilateral
Instrument to Implement Tax Treaty Related Matters to Prevent BEPS;
development of a fund by high-income countries to assist Sub-Saharan
African nations in building tax administrative capacity; and reconsideration
of some of the BEPS reform proposals, particularly the Digital Economy twopillar proposals, with the aim of according agency to Sub-Saharan Africa as
 Theodore Rinehart, Professor of Business Law, George Washington University. (c), 2021. All
Rights Reserved. This article is dedicated with much love to my mother, Marion B. Brown, who is
responsible for any good thing I have done or achieved. I would like to thank Ms. Lori Fossum,
Reference Librarian at the George Washington University Law School, for awesome research
assistance, and the organizers and participants at the Duke Tax Policy Seminar for very helpful
comments and feedback. I would also like to thank the members of the Pepperdine Caruso School of
Law for amazing support, especially Ms. Mariana Orbay and Mr. Zachary Carstens. Any errors found
are solely those of the author.

995

[Vol. 48: 995, 2021]

Tax Incentives and Sub-Saharan Africa
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

it constructs a blueprint for solid emergence from economic hardship
heightened by the pandemic.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The economic viability of the poor economies of the developing world,1
particularly sub-Saharan Africa, continues to be a secondary focus of the highincome countries of the developed world as they move forward with projects
to ensure international cooperation to combat tax avoidance and to harmonize
the standards for evaluating the substantive integrity of national regimes.2 The
2013 Base Erosion Profit Shifting (BEPS) project of the G20, coordinated and
managed by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), has achieved an overhaul of tax standards, but that process did not
place a sufficient emphasis on the particular concerns of the developing
world.3 The OECD expressed concern and took action to include input from
these nations, but this was near the end of the process of consensus formation.4
By providing an opportunity for consultation, but only after the paradigms,
dictates, and core principles were adopted in final reports issued in 2015, the
developed world undermined meaningful input from Africa regarding the
foundational principles of international tax reform.
Almost in tandem with the OECD project, the United Nations (U.N.) was
renewing, expanding, and strengthening sustainable development goals
(SDGs) to be achieved by 2030.5 These SDGs address a range of issues
deemed critical to the survival of populations residing in low-income
countries.6 These include elimination of poverty and hunger, climate action,

1. The focus of this article is on sub-Saharan Africa, a region in which a majority of the member
countries are ranked poor based on World Bank human development measures. Global Economic
Indicators – Statistics & Facts, STATISTA (2020).
2. Press Release, Economic and Social Council, International Cooperation to End Tax Crimes
Crucial for Achieving Sustainable Growth Agenda, Speakers Say as Development Financing Forum
Concludes, U.N. Press Release ECOSOC/6840 (May 25, 2017).
3. See International Collaboration to End Tax Avoidance, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/tax/
beps/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2021).
4. See, e.g., Carmel Peters, Developing Countries’ Reactions to the G20/OECD Action Plan on
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, BULL. FOR INT’L TAX’N 375, 375, 375 n.1 (2015), https://www.
un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/11STM_G20OecdBeps.pdf.
5. See Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, G.A. Res. 70/1,
UNITED NATIONS 13–27 (Oct. 21, 2015), https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda (last visited Feb. 12, 2021).
6. Id. The initial set of goals, issued in 2012, were revisited in 2017. Sha-Zukang (UnderSecretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs), The Millennium Development Goals Report
2012, 4–5 UNITED NATIONS (2012), https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/MDG%20Report%
202012.pdf. The 2017 report launched 17 goals to “transform the world.” Liu Zhenmin (UnderSecretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs), The Sustainable Development Goals Report
2020, 6–22 UNITED NATIONS (2020), https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2020/The-Sustainable-
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reduction of economic inequality, and private-governmental partnerships to
achieve these ends.7 A consortium of private actors and not-for-profit
institutions has committed to incorporating the SDGs into their corporate
practices.8 The World Bank, the nongovernmental representative of the
world’s richest countries, launched an initiative to advance the SDGs through
its Human-Centered Business Model (HCBM), of which the OECD
Development Centre became a sponsor. The HCBM is supported by five
pillars, including a Fiscal Pillar.9 The Fiscal Pillar Work Group has offered
“taxation initiatives that will provide ways in which governments can use
taxation policy to achieve a set of human-centered performance goals” which
are informed by the SDGs.10 Key to the ability of low-income countries to
attract investment essential to fund infrastructure needs of constituent
populations is an international tax regime constructed with the aim of
equipping them with the capacity to collect adequate revenue in a sustainable
manner.
From the initial stages, the BEPS project proceeded with a focus on the
special concerns of high-income countries. This is understandable given the
membership of the OECD and the source of the mandate for reform (the
G20).11 The existence of the separate tax regimes of developed nations,
including the United States and most OECD members, has led multinationals
to attempt to exploit gaps that allow minimization of tax liability in their
resident countries or to shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions to escape or
substantially reduce taxation. The G20 initiated the BEPS project to avoid
DevelopmentGoals-Report-2020.pdf [hereinafter SDGR 2020 Report].
7. SDGR 2020 Report, supra note 6, at 6–7, 15, 18, 22.
8. See Our Strategic Priorities, B TEAM, https://bteam.org/strategy (last visited Feb. 21, 2021).
The B Team, consisting of twenty-nine leaders of industry and the non-profit sector, has signed on to
implementing the SDGs in the areas of climate change, gender equality, and governance. See Leaders,
B TEAM, https://bteam.org/who-we-are/leaders (last visited Feb. 21, 2021). The Team’s commitment
is to “encourage adoption of responsible corporate tax practice and advocacy for fair and effective tax
systems that contribute to society and sustainable development.” Governance, B TEAM,
https://bteam.org/our-work/causes/governance (last visited Feb. 21, 2021); Tax and the United
Nations Sustainable Development Goals, INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, iccwbo.org/content/
uploads/sites/3/2018/02/icc-position-paper-on-tax-and-the-un-sdgs.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2021).
9. See The Human-Centered Business Model, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/dev/human-centredbusiness-model-hcbm.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2021).
10. Karen B. Brown, Tax Policy: A Tool to Support Sustainable Growth (Pillar 4: Fiscal Matters)
(World Bank) (2019).
11. See OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 11 (2013) [hereinafter AP
ON BASE EROSION] (“The G20 finance ministers called on the OECD to develop an action plan to
address BEPS issues in a co-ordinated and comprehensive manner.”).
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revenue shortfalls caused by a wide variety of tax avoidance techniques that
threaten to result in inadequate public funding to sustain infrastructure and a
social safety network for residents. The process resulted in fifteen primary
recommendations for reform that invoked and continue to invoke controversy
even among the instigators.12
The emphasis on solutions tailored to the existing separate tax systems of
high-income countries has resulted in prescriptions for reform that are
sophisticated, complex, and costly to implement. Solutions to the serious
challenges posed by international tax avoidance, while welcome, are often not
easily adapted to the circumstances of sub-Saharan nations. BEPS solutions
are not readily achieved by countries in that region.
The advent of the 2019 pandemic places even greater pressure on highincome countries to support a version of tax reform within the capacity of the
developing world that addresses its needs.13 The U.N. has acknowledged that,
even before COVID-19, efforts to meet the SDGs by 2030 were not on track.14
Food insecurity, degradation of the environment, and high levels of inequality
persisted throughout the world. The pandemic has brought a challenge to the
capacity of health systems, threatened the livelihood of half the global
workforce, and returned tens of millions of people to poverty and hunger.15
As a result, the need for revenue mobilization in the sub-Saharan region has
become even more pronounced.
A particular focus on sub-Saharan Africa is imperative. According to the
World Bank Group, because of the pandemic, sub-Saharan Africa is expected
to enter its first recession in a quarter of a century.16 Economic activity there
is expected to contract by 3.3%, with real gross domestic product returning to
2007 levels.17 The Group suspects that COVID-19 could push 40 million
12. Mindy Herzfeld, The Case Against BEPS: Lessons for Tax Coordination, 21 FLA. TAX REV.
1, 5 (2017).
13. See, e.g., The Impact of the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Crisis on Development Finance, OECD
1, 11 (June 24, 2020), http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/theimpact-of-thecoronavirus-covid-19-crisis-on-development-finance-9de00b3b/.
14. See Amy Lieberman, SDGs Show Slow Progress, Not on Track to Reach 2030 Targets, UN
Reports, DEVEX (June 22, 2018), https://www.devex.com/news/sdgs-show-slowprogress-not-ontrack-to-reach-2030-targets-un-reports-92971.
15. See SDGR Report 2020, supra note 6, at 2.
16. See World Bank Confirms Economic Downturn in Sub-Saharan Africa, Outlines Key Policies
Needed for Recovery, WORLD BANK (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/pressrelease/2020/10/08/world-bank-confirms-economic-downturn-in-sub-saharan-africa-outlines-keypolices-needed-for-recovery [hereinafter World Bank Confirms Economic Downturn].
17. Id.
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people in the region into extreme poverty, erasing nearly five years of
progress.18 Spillovers from the global recession brought on by the pandemic
and the effects of domestic lockdowns have lowered growth levels,
specifically by 6.1% in Nigeria and 17.1% in South Africa.19 Greatest
declines are expected in East and Southern Africa, based on declines in output
in South African and Angola.20 Most countries in the region are expected to
emerge from the pandemic with historically large budget deficits, leaving
severe debt challenges.21
This article considers the origins of the BEPS project, which provides a
significant and detailed look at a range of complex problems confronting the
international tax system. Modern ways of doing business (through ecommerce and other mechanisms) gave rise to sophisticated tax avoidance
devices that exploited an antiquated set of tax rules.22 The BEPS initiatives
are defensive measures taken to prevent aggressive tax planning that exploits
unanticipated advantages gained through manipulation of the differences in
the laws of the separate countries in which multinational enterprises operate.
BEPS and related projects have presented standards and imposed obligations,
but they have addressed issues facing the sub-Saharan region primarily on the
margins. Tangential focus on sub-Saharan Africa came not out of animus, but
out of initial choices about the direction of reform. Subsequent efforts to
address Africa hold promise, but more can be done. This requires partnership
with the countries in this region to develop tax incentives that create a path
for investment in a manner that advances the important goals of the U.N.’s
SDGs.
II. STANDARDS AND BURDENS
One of the major initiatives designed to promulgate common standards
affecting substantive tax rules was the OECD’s Harmful Tax Competition

18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id.
Id.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECON. FOR THE AFRICAN REGION, AFRICA’S PULSE: AN ANALYSIS OF
ISSUES SHAPING AFRICA’S ECONOMIC FUTURE 29–30 (2020).
22. See, e.g., Sony Kassam, E-Commerce Tax Avoidance Leads to Banks Being Tapped As
Collectors, BLOOMBERG TAX (Sept. 4, 2019, 12:01 AM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-taxreport/e-commerce-tax-avoidance-leads-to-banks-being-tapped-as-collectors (stating how tax
authorities enlisted help from banks to collect untaxed revenue going through e-commerce platforms).
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Report (HTCR), issued in 1998.23 The HTCR criticized two types of tax
regimes: 1) tax havens generally imposing no or nominal tax on income, and
2) harmful tax regimes in which a country collects significant income tax
revenue but its system has preferential features that subjects specified income
to no or low taxation.24 The OECD deemed these regimes harmful for several
reasons. These included: distortion of investment flows, undermining
integrity and fairness of tax systems, re-shaping desired level and mix of taxes
and public spending, shift of tax burden to less mobile bases, and increase in
administrative and compliance costs on tax authorities.25 Failure of the HTCR
to condemn tax strategies, which developed countries were using in their own
regimes to compete,26 signaled that the OECD’s real concern was on regimedesign that allowed offending countries to attract investment from its
members.
Developing countries appeared on the original so-called “black-list,”
published by the OECD presumably to bring notoriety, signaling that these
countries failed to comply with generally accepted standards.27 Noting the
absence of a role for developing countries in constructing international
standards, the list was decried by those outside the OECD as a patriarchal
move to portray those listed in a bad light and as in need of policing.
The opprobrium resulting from assessment of country regimes as harmful
(or not) led to complaints concerning the lack of participation by developing
and other outsider countries in the initial construction of the standards. Some
argued for a focus on transparency through exchange of information in lieu of
stigma-creating blacklisting.28 In numerous meetings post launch of the
23. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (1998) [hereinafter
OECD, HTC]; see also Asa Johansson et al., Anti-Avoidance Rules Against International Tax
Planning: A Classification (OECD Econ. Dep’t, Working Paper, Paper No. 1356, 2016).
24. OECD, HTC, supra note 23, at 16, 19.
25. Id. at 16.
26. Id. at 8–9. Ireland, for example, a member of the OECD and the European Union, shifted to a
12.5% corporate income tax rate in a move designed to attract multinational businesses. Jonathan
Keane, Ireland Stands by Its Iconic 12.5% Tax Rate as OECD Races for Reforms, CNBC (Nov. 3,
2020, 1:16 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/03/ireland-stands-by-its-corporate-tax-rate-as-oecdraces-for-reforms-.html?&qsearchterm=ireland%20stands. In a compromise intended to appease
members, the OECD blessed low tax-rate-type competition when built into the general tax scheme
(i.e., the low-rate applied generally and was not limited to certain limited types of income (known as
“ring-fencing”). OECD, HTC, supra note 23, at 26.
27. See The OECD Issues The List of Unco-operative Tax Havens, OECD (Apr. 18, 2002),
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/theoecdissuesthelistofunco-operativetaxhavens.htm.
28. See, e.g., International Tax Standards, OECD http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/what-we-
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Report, representatives of developing nations rejected classification resulting
from a process into which they had no input.29 This led to the formation in
2000 of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information in
Tax Matters (Global Forum, or Forum), now comprising 161 member-nations,
including sub-Saharan countries, which focuses on assessment of
transparency in tax administration and effective exchange of information in
civil and criminal tax matters instead of on shaming and judgment.30 The
standards used to review these tax systems is largely reflected in the OECD’s
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters.31 There is
peer examination of the tax systems of Forum members, which accords a role
to all member nations expanded beyond the smaller OECD membership.32
Along with the HTCR, the OECD issued its Tax Sparing Report,33 which
condemned a practice by which many countries provided incentives for
investment by their resident multinationals in developing countries. One
version of tax sparing allowed residents a credit against home country liability
for fictional taxes on income derived in the developing country, which was
exempt in the source country because of a tax holiday offered to certain
classes of investors.34 The OECD recommended an end to the practice of
granting tax-sparing credits for several reasons. Primarily, it felt that the grant
of a tax-sparing credit might unfairly compete with industries in the residence

do/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2021) (“The Global Forum supports its members in tackling offshore tax
evasion by monitoring, reviewing and assisting jurisdictions to implement the international standards
on transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes.”).
29. See, e.g., Alexander Townsend, Jr., The Global Schoolyard Bully: The Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development’s Coercive Efforts to Control Tax Competition, 25
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 215, 217–18 (2001).
30. See Putting an End to Offshore Tax Evasion, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/
(last visited Feb. 22, 2021); see also Overview, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/whowe-are/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2021) (“The Global Forum is a group of over 160 jurisdictions that
includes all G20 countries, financial centres, and the majority of its members are developing countries.
Together they work on an equal footing to put an end to offshore tax evasion.”).
31. See Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/convention-on-mutual-administrativeassistance-in-tax-matters.htm [hereinafter Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax
Matters Website] (last updated Sept. 2020). This is based on a 2002 predecessor, the OECD Model
Agreement on Exchange of Information in Tax Matters. See OECD, THE MULTILATERAL
CONVENTION ON MUTUAL ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE IN TAX MATTERS 31 (2011).
32. See OECD Tax Policy Studies, Taxation of Household Savings, OECD,
https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264289536-en (last visited Feb. 22, 2021).
33. OECD, TAX SPARING: A RECONSIDERATION (1998) [hereinafter TAX SPARING REPORT].
34. Id. at 21–22.
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country (because moving operations to a host country with a zero rate of tax
and allowing a credit for the income derived against residence country tax
would disadvantage residence country businesses subject to tax without the
benefit of a deemed foreign tax credit). It also contended that there was a
likelihood that profits from operations might be repatriated to a residence
country that features a regime exempting foreign source income, rather than
re-invested in the host country.
An important reason to question tax sparing, not offered by the OECD,
was the imbalance of power in the negotiation between the host country
offering the tax holiday and the multinational corporation resident in a
developed country. The dangers posed by acceding to tax-rate-lowering
demands and other concessions could harm the ability of the host developing
country to protect an adequate revenue base or shore up other factors in the
economy that could support achievement of sustainability goals.35 Moreover,
the OECD’s contention that tax sparing was no longer needed because
developing countries had become “economically much more sophisticated”
and had “reached an economic level which [was] equivalent or even superior
to that of some [OECD] Member countries” failed to justify such a move
concerning sub-Saharan African countries that quite obviously did not hold
such a position of economic strength.36
When the Tax Sparing Report was issued, all but five OECD member
countries had tax-sparing treaties with non-members.37 This number
gradually eroded after the OECD’s recommendation that members abrogate
treaties allowing the practice.38 Today, only a handful of countries, including

35. See, e.g., Karen B. Brown, Missing Africa: Should U.S. International Tax Rules Accommodate
Investment in Developing Countries?, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. LAW 45, 68–76 (2002) (recommending
a treaty-based exemption system in lieu of a tax sparing credit for income derived from increased
investment in sub-Saharan Africa with provisions for environmental sustainability, worker rights, and
sustainable tax rates).
36. TAX SPARING REPORT, supra note 33, at 21.
37. Id. at 68–69. Only Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, Turkey, and the United States had no tax-sparing
treaties. Id. at 68–69. The U.S. has firmly opposed grant of the credit. See id. at 68–69.
38. Id. at 41–43. The OECD advised that the practice of granting tax sparing credits should be reexamined, with the Committee on Fiscal Affairs recommending that they should be granted only to
“countries the economic level of which is considerably below that of . . . member countries.” Id. at
42–43. The Report, however, caused countries to reconsider the practice even for needy countries.
See, e.g., Kim Brooks, Tax Sparing: A Needed Incentive for Foreign Investment in Low-Income
Countries or an Unnecessary Revenue Sacrifice?, 34 QUEENS L.J. 505, 538 (2009) (noting that any
benefits from attracting foreign investment are outweighed by the costs to the low-income country);
Deborah Toaze, Tax Sparing: Good Intentions, Unintended Results, 49 CANADIAN TAX J. 879, 880
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France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, continue the
practice.39
The Tax Sparing Report recommendations placed developing countries
in a tough spot. They were forced to fit their own regimes into conformity
with a template into which they had very little, if any, input. Consequently,
some of these countries found themselves in the position of signaling
acceptance of a developed-world standard in an effort to be viewed as
cooperative, while surreptitiously doing what was necessary to attract
investment even if those measures deviated from the enunciated norms.40
Since the HTCR, the most extensive push to develop international
standards governing emerging issues in international taxation has been the
BEPS initiative directed by the OECD. This initiative gained momentum after
meetings in 2012 led G20 nations to recommend measures that would target
a number of areas in which multinationals gained unintended tax advantages
simply by exploiting differences in countries’ tax laws.41 Areas of concern
are wide-ranging and include targeting schemes that use hybrid entities42 to
achieve double non-taxation of income, strengthening controlled foreign
corporation (CFC) provisions to limit tax avoidance effected through offshore subsidiaries, restricting rules allowing excessive interest deductions that
erode the tax bases of residence countries of both the payer and payee,
cracking down on treaty and transfer pricing abuses, and eliminating harmful
(2001) (“[T]ax sparing has produced only marginal economic benefits while providing opportunities
for tax avoidance.”).
39. See Celine Azemar & Dhammika Dharmapala, Tax Sparing Agreements, Territorial Tax
Reforms, and Foreign Direct Investment, J. PUB. ECON. 1, 20 (2018), http://pubdocs.worldbank.
org/en/281751559591312068/celine-Azmar.pdf.
40. See, e.g., Jalia Kangave, International Taxation: The Case of Uganda, in TAXATION &
DEVELOPMENT—A COMPARATIVE STUDY 280, 283 (2017) (Karen B. Brown ed., 2017) (noting
Uganda’s deference to OECD guidelines in documents and its commitment to taking steps to conform
with internationally accepted tax practices, but acknowledging that “[w]hile there is no legal
framework backing tax holidays, the government continues to provide them on an ad hoc basis”).
41. OECD, BEPS PROJECT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT: 2015 FINAL REPORTS 4 (2015)
[hereinafter 2015 FINAL REPORTS]. In particular, the OECD maintained that “[t]he current rules have
. . . revealed weaknesses that create opportunities for Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), thus
requiring a bold move by policy makers to restore confidence in the system and ensure that profits are
taxed where economic activities take place and value is created.” Id.
42. See PEI Staff, Hybrid Entities and Tax Treaties, PRIV. EQUITY INT’L (July 8, 2004),
https://www.privateequityinternational.com/hybrid-entities-and-tax-treaties/. Hybrid entities are
those classified differently by two or more countries (e.g., an entity treated as a partnership by one and
a corporation by another) with the result that the entity may pay no tax in any jurisdiction, often
because of tax treaty advantages. Id.
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tax practices.43 The BEPS project resulted in a final report issued in 2015.44
Connected with implementing these standards, in December 2016, the OECD
adopted a model Multilateral Instrument intended to modify existing bilateral
tax treaties in order to permit incorporation of many of the BEPS standards.45
The BEPS Inclusive Framework, finalized in 2017, invited non-member
countries, including developing countries, to work with the OECD and G20
members on issues related to standards and attendant issues, and to review
and monitor implementation of the entire BEPS package.46 As noted by
prominent scholars, however, neither the BEPS Project nor the Inclusive
Framework was “designed to deal with the issues faced by developing
countries.”47 Several subsequent reports have detailed implementation of the
prescribed measures.48
The BEPS initiatives were a first step in an effort to ultimately establish
universal standards, designed with the intention of engaging so-called “third
countries” (non-OECD and non-G20 nations).49 Input by these third parties
was delayed, however, until after finalization of key components.50 Launch
of the Project in 2013 and issuance of final reports at the end of 2015 without
full third-party participation ensured that the resulting standards could not
fully address developing country needs. There was limited consultation with
developing countries before 2015 in the form of working groups, but this was
43. AP ON BASE EROSION, supra note 11, at 29–40. There are fifteen action areas. Id. at 14–24.
In its action plan, the G20 directed the OECD to develop items addressing “instances where the
interaction of different tax rules [led] to double non-taxation or less than single taxation” and
“arrangements that achieve[d] no or low taxation by shifting profits away from jurisdictions where the
activities creating those profits [took] place.” Id. at 10.
44. BEPS 2015 Final Reports, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-2015-final-reports.htm (last
visited Feb. 23, 2021).
45. See OECD, INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS 1–44 (2017); OECD, BACKGROUND BRIEF:
INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS 5–23 (2017).
46. See BEPS 2015 Final Reports, supra note 44.
47. Irma Johanna Mosquera Valderrama et al., Tax and Development: The Link Between
International Taxation, The Base Erosion Profit Shifting Project and the 2030 Sustainable
Development Agenda 8 (United Nations Univ., Working Paper No. W-2018/4, 2018).
48. See BEPS Reports, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps-reports.htm (last visited Feb. 23,
2021).
49. See OECD, COUNTERING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES MORE EFFECTIVELY, TAKING INTO
ACCOUNT TRANSPARENCY AND SUBSTANCE, ACTION 5: 2015 FINAL REPORT 68 (2015) [hereinafter
ACTION 5 FINAL REPORT].
50. See id. (“Action 5 of the BEPS Action Plan (OECD, 2013) explicitly recognised the need to
involve third countries and requested the [Forum on Harmful Tax Practices] to develop a strategy to
engage non-OECD/ non-G20 countries into the work on harmful tax practices.”).
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after the organizing principles of reform were in place.51
The developing world’s enthusiasm for an active role in shaping the
BEPS prescriptions was evident in its demand that the U.N. Committee of
Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters (U.N. Tax Committee)
take the leadership role in charting the path to tax reform.52 The goal was to
construct a process open to worldwide approaches to taxation, such as those
embodied in formulary apportionment and other proposals, that seeks to
bridge the jurisdictional boundaries of the separate country regimes. This was
the approach developing countries had in mind when they advocated for
institution of a World Tax Organization.53
For years, developing countries, lacking a membership role in the OECD,
have urged the establishment of a World Tax Organization that would allow
a broader-than-high-income country view and seek solutions to cross-border
tax avoidance that consider their needs.54 This work would have been taken
up by the U.N. Tax Committee, upgraded to the status of an intergovernmental body. As an intergovernmental body, the U.N. Tax Committee,
with expanded governmental representation and an adequate budget, would
have been in a position to convene a “World Tax Organization,” a significant
counter-weight to membership of the OECD.55 Under a World Tax
Organization, the direction of tax reform could have questioned building the
BEPS project to protect choices made by OECD members about their own tax
bases.56
51. See generally OECD, PART 1 OF A REPORT TO G20 DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP ON THE
IMPACT OF BEPS IN LOW INCOME COUNTRIES (2014) [hereinafter DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP
PART 1]; OECD, PART 2 OF A REPORT TO G20 DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP ON THE IMPACT OF
BEPS IN LOW INCOME COUNTRIES (2014); see also Irma Johanna Mosquera Valderrama, The OECDBEPS Measures to Deal with Aggressive Tax Planning in South America and Sub-Saharan Africa:
The Challenges Ahead, 43 INTERTAX 615, 616, 619 (2015) (detailing U.N.-sponsored workshops in
2014 addressing BEPS on Tax Base Protection for Developing Countries, an IMF policy paper
addressing spillovers (the impact on developed country tax practices on developing countries), and
questionnaires solicited by the U.N. from developing countries to obtain information to be addressed
at a second conference on protecting the developing countries’ tax base).
52. U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Countries Reach Historic Agreement to Generate
Financing for New Sustainable Development Agenda, https://www.un.org/africarenewal/news/
countries-reach-historic-agreement-generate-financing-new-sustainable-development-agenda
(last
visited Feb. 23, 2021).
53. See David Spencer, U.N. Tax Committee, Developing Countries, and Civil Society
Organizations, 26 J. INT’L TAX’N 42, 44 (2015).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. (citing Mindy Herzfeld’s observation that “[a]t the core, the concern by Western nations
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This proposal to expand the U.N. Tax Committee into a World Tax
Organization was rejected at the United Nations Third International
Conference on Financing and Development, held in Addis Ababa in July
2015, a decision said to make sense in large part because the OECD’s BEPS
project was already underway.57 Although the conference concluded that the
OECD-led process would adequately account for the concerns of developing
nations, a few months later, in October 2015, the OECD issued its final BEPS
reports on the fifteen covered initiatives.58 The underlying premise of the final
proposals for a response to targeted types of tax avoidance (namely,
exploitation of gaps in different countries’ tax systems that lead to nontaxation of income by any country and use of various vehicles to shift income
to low or no tax jurisdictions) was protection of the tax bases of OECD
members and the G20. The final reports reflect an intention to involve
developing nations in the implementation of the initiatives, but this came after
fundamental steps to shape the project had been taken.59
One of the critical issues concerning the direction of the BEPS Project,
but foreclosed from consideration at an early stage, was whether tax avoidance
could be better addressed by a global approach in the design of different
countries’ regimes. Harmonization or coordination of countries’ substantive
tax rules could occur in any number of ways, including one of the dominant
proposals—formulary apportionment. To describe it simply, formulary
apportionment would require all countries to agree to allocate rights to tax
income of multinational enterprises under an agreed formula. This method
about upgrading the status of the U.N. Tax Committee may reflect the broader fear of the United States
and the countries of the EU that as the agenda of international tax reform—and ultimately international
tax rules more broadly—tilts from the West to the East, the historical system that generally favored
residence or capital-exporting countries will also tilt to favor source countries”); see also Mindy
Herzfeld, New Analysis: Who Will Control the Future of International Tax Policy, TAXNOTES (May
4, 2015), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-international/tax-policy/news-analysis-who-will
-control-future-international-tax-policy/2015/05/04/h1jw?highlight=core%2C%20the%20concern%
20by%20Western%20nations.
57. U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Countries Reach Historic Agreement to Generate
Financing for New Sustainable Development Agenda (July 15, 2015), https://www.un.org/en/
development/desa/news/financing/historic-agreement-sustainable-development-agenda.html (noting
how the newly adopted Addis Ababa Action Agenda “calls for strengthening support for the work of
the U.N. Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters to improve its
effectiveness and operational capacity”).
58. See 2015 FINAL REPORTS, supra note 41, at 13–18.
59. Id. at 4 (commenting that the report “represents the results of a major and unparalleled effort
by OECD and G20 countries working together on an equal footing with the participation of an
increasing number of developing countries”).
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allocates income on a worldwide basis and is designed to eliminate the ability
of businesses to shift income across countries through legal and accounting
techniques.60
Under one proposal advocated by Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah, the
worldwide income derived by each business activity of a multinational group
(based on the functions performed by related parties) would be determined by
subtracting worldwide expenses and allocating the net result based on a global
accounting system among all countries in which the activity was conducted.61
An estimated market return on tax-deductible expenses (“routine” income)
would be allocated to the country in which the expenses were incurred, and
the remainder of the income (“residual” income) would be allocated based on
the group’s relative sales into each country—a destination sales-based
formulary apportionment method.62 A variant of this method was embraced
by the BEPS Action Eleven on transfer pricing, but it was rejected as an
overarching theory that could have led to an entirely different set of reform
prescriptions. The Avi-Yonah proposal held promise because it aimed to
address the ability of multinationals to artificially shift income and ownership
of intangible property.63 This type of income manipulation occurs between
multinational residents of high-income countries in transactions involving
developing countries—a problem with no ready solution.64
While formulary apportionment may not be the final answer to the
problem of international tax avoidance through income shifting,65 it provides
an example of a worldwide approach that could have involved developing
countries in the tax regime design process at the outset. Nevertheless, as early
as 2013 when it formulated its action plan, the OECD noted that “there [was]
consensus among governments that moving to a system of formulary [or other
60. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al.,, Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to
Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 497, 507–509 (2009).
61. Id. at 508.
62. Id. at 508–09.
63. See C. Annalise Musselman, The Best of Both Methods: A Proposal for a Hybrid International
Transfer Pricing Method, 16 S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 57, 72 (2020) (asserting that the possible benefit
of formulary apportionment is the method’s ability to “diminish[] multinational companies’ incentives
to shift income from one country to another”).
64. Id. at 73 (stating that, while the “current system allows for corporations to shift income
primarily through the relocation of intangibles to lower-tax jurisdictions,” the formulary
apportionment method does not let this artificial shifting of income and intangible assets “have much
effect on their end tax liability”).
65. See, e.g., Susan C. Morse, Revisiting Global Formulary Apportionment, 29 VA. TAX REV. 593
(2010).
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worldwide] apportionment of profits [was] not a viable way forward.”66
Devising the proposal and later seeking developing country buy-in seems
coercive and unilateral.67
With only a peripheral role in tax design, developing countries are
nonetheless expected to take on significant burdens to achieve a label of
“compliant” with an increasing burden of standards to be met.68
Implementation of the BEPS proposals will require developing countries to
shoulder a substantial compliance burden, including revision of internal
statutory law and treaty rules.69
The past two decades have also witnessed a deluge of standard-making in
the administrative arena, supplementing or even standing apart from the
initiatives seeking to harmonize substantive law. In addition to the Mutual
Administrative Assistance Convention arising out of the HTC project and the
Multilateral Instrument, both described above, the United States, the
European Union, and the OECD have heightened requirements for recordkeeping, information exchange, data collection, and administrative
assistance.70 Among the most important of these are the Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act (FATCA) rules and the European Union-led Common
Reporting Standards.71
The FATCA rules, of primary focus in this article, require financial
institutions to disclose account information, obtain reliable documentation on
the identity and whereabouts of the account holder, and withhold tax on
payments received on behalf of U.S. taxpayers in the event appropriate
documentation is not obtained.72 Countries and their financial institutions
66. AP ON BASE EROSION, supra note 11, at 14.
67. David E. Spencer, The EOCD Work Program: Digitalization of the Economy, Part 10, 31 J.
INT’L TAX’N 62, 62 (2020) (citing Lucas De Lima Carvalho, The Trouble with ‘Pillars’ in
International Tax Policy, TAXNOTES (July 2, 2020), https://www.taxnotes.com/special-reports/digitaleconomy/trouble-pillars-international-tax-policy/2020/07/02/2cnhm).
68. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Haiyan Xu, Evaluating BEPS: A Reconsideration of the Benefits
Principle and Proposal for UN Oversight, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 185, 211 (2016) (stating that
developing countries “might be hurt due to the effect of negative spill-over arising from the
implementation of the BEPS project . . . because of their limited influence in the renovation of the
current rules”).
69. See Eric M. Zolt, Tax Treaties and Developing Countries, 72 N.Y.U. TAX L. REV. 111, 120
(2018).
70. See Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters Website, supra note 31.
71. See Richard Levine et al., FATCA and the Common Reporting Standard: A Comparison, 27 J.
INT’L TAX’N 43, 43–44 (2016).
72. See Arthur J. Cockfield, Big Data and Tax Haven Secrecy, 18 FLA. TAX REV. 483, 494–95
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were forced, as of the end of 2016,73 to become “FATCA-compliant” in order
to avoid the most serious consequence, which is the inability to receive
payments from U.S. banks and other non-bank financial institutions or entities
(including those in which a U.S. person has an equity or debt interest),74 free
of the imposition of the U.S. withholding tax.75 Compliance with FATCA
also requires the automatic exchange of information regarding offshore
financial accounts and assets of U.S. citizens and residents.
The FATCA accords did not occur without significant objection by other
countries and their financial institutions. The particular concern was the
unilateral “extraterritorial enforcement” of the U.S. tax law aimed at
uncovering hidden assets of U.S. citizens and residents.76 FATCA compliance
was assured nonetheless because no foreign bank or non-bank financial
institution could afford to lose a U.S. customer base—a result almost
guaranteed if they did not comply with FATCA requirements, because U.S.
banks would be forced to withhold payments to these entities on behalf of
U.S. customers or interest-holders. As of November 2020, 113 countries were
FATCA-compliant through entry into complex agreements with the United
States. Some of these agreements require the country in question to provide
specified information directly to the IRS.77 Others involve reporting by the
foreign financial institution resident in these countries directly to the IRS.78
These agreements have resulted from lengthy negotiations and place
considerable burden on the signatories. To be a player in the global
(2016) (outlining the FATCA requirements).
73. See DUN & BRADSTREET, THE FATCA REPORT 2 (2016) (“In most jurisdictions 30th June
2016 was set as the deadline for compliance.”).
74. Levine et al., supra note 71, at 46.
75. See, e.g., Michael L. Buenger, The EU’s ETS and Global Aviation: Why “Local Rules” Still
Matter and May Matter Even More in the Future, 41 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 417, 428 n.50 (2013)
(stating that, under FATCA, foreign banks must “locate American account holders and disclose their
balances, receipts, and withdrawals to the Internal Revenue Service or be subject to a thirty percent
withholding tax on income from U.S. financial assets held by the banks”) (citing Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1471–74 (2012)).
76. Levine et al., supra note 71, at 46.
77. See Nirav Dhanawade, I Got 99 Problems and They’re All FATCA, 35 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS.
139, 159 (2014) (noting that these agreements, known as Model 1 Intergovernmental Agreements,
require a “dual exchange of information between the United States and a foreign government regarding
their respective resident account holders” and require foreign financial institutions “to report specified
information about accounts held by U.S. citizens”).
78. Id. at 161 (stating that these agreements, known as Model 2 Intergovernmental Agreements,
“cut out the middleman by requiring [foreign financial institutions] to directly report information to
the IRS”).
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marketplace, low-income countries must become FATCA-compliant.79
The OECD has developed a parallel information reporting regime, known
as the Common Reporting Standard (CRS). CRS will eventually require the
signatory nations to automatically exchange prescribed financial asset
information. CRS signatories enter into Competent Authority Agreements
(CAAs) like FATCA Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs), but the CRS
enforcement mechanism is different. With the absence of penalty measures
like the ones available to the United States in the event of noncompliance,
enforcement of the CAAs will depend upon the internal laws of the respective
parties to the agreement. As of December 2020, 110 countries had committed
to become, or had become, CRS signatories.80 Of these, nine developing
countries had committed to agreements implementing CRS.81 Absent from
the group is the United States, which has indicated that it will not sign.82
The burden of conformity is considerable.83 Reform was constructed
initially without regard for the special circumstances of low-income countries.
As a result, some solutions interfere with revenue-raising strategies of these
countries.84 Others are a challenge to the capacity of their tax administrations.

79. See, e.g., Chi Tran, International Transfer Pricing and the Elusive Arm’s Length Standard: A
Proposal for Disclosure of Advance Pricing Agreements as a Tool for Taxpayer Equality, 25 SW. J.
INT’L L. 207, 209 (2019) (noting how developing countries also need to be FATCA compliant to
improve their education, healthcare, and infrastructure). Currently, the signatories from the Caribbean
region are The Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Dominica, Guyana, St. Kitts and
Nevis, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and Turks and Caicos.
80. Signatories of the Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on Automatic Exchange of
Financial Account Information and Intended First Information Exchange Date, OECD (Dec. 10,
2020), http://oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/international-framework-for-the-crs/crs-mcaasignatories.pdf [hereinafter Signatories of the CRS].
81. Id. (showing that the developing country signatories include Antiqua and Barbuda, Aruba, The
Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Ghana, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Martin, and Trinidad and Tobago).
82. Perhaps because it was the first mover, the United States is the one nonparticipant in CRS
exempted from hardships resulting from non-signatory status. See Levine et al., supra note 71, at 50.
83. See Ivan O. Ozai, Tax Competition and the Ethics of Burden Sharing, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
61, 71 (2018) (noting the larger burden for collecting taxes and compliance costs in the developing
world than the developed world).
84. See Zolt, supra note 69, at 114 (suggesting that “developing countries should hesitate before
. . . entering into tax treaties with developed countries” because of (a) “doubts about the general utility
of tax treaties”; (b) “a belief that the lost revenue from yielding tax rights exceeds the benefits of these
treaties”; and (c) “concerns that tax treaties facilitate aggressive tax-avoidance strategies”).
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III. INCENTIVES AND SDGS
Consultation to determine the issues facing developing countries in the
implementation of BEPS revealed the following challenges:
• The BEPS focus on sophisticated tax planning techniques is of
limited interest to developing countries because they typically
face simpler tax avoidance techniques not captured by BEPS
proposals.85
• Legislation in developing countries may be insufficiently
complete to target areas of greatest risk because multinationals
may be able to shift profits by means that avoid focus.86
• Developing countries are often unable to obtain information
necessary to enable adequate risk assessment.87
• Developing countries lack administrative capacity (structure and
staff) to enforce complex anti-avoidance rules or to apply
effective dispute resolution mechanisms.88
• Regional mechanisms that support political awareness of the
challenges of base erosion and profit shifting or buy-in to the
need for change and resource commitment are lacking.89
• Developing countries are relegated to providing tax incentives
for investment from high-income multinationals that ultimately
may undermine revenue goals (a so-called “race to the bottom”
that may worsen the economic position of these countries).90
Many of the challenges arise from the initial development and design of
the BEPS project without addressing the burden of implementation by
developing countries. The BEPS project not only failed to acknowledge
tensions between the OECD member countries and the developing world, but
it also failed to conceive of its goal as one to question the accepted roots of
the international tax system as one based on self-interest and re-tool it as one
based on global welfare maximization.91 As Professor Mindy Herzfeld noted:

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP PART 1, supra note 51, at 12.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 14.
Herzfeld, supra note 12, at 6–7.
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The project also failed to address another set of broader, more
philosophical questions, rooted in economics but also in concerns
over fairness in the context of global economic development. The
tools that public finance economists have developed for analyzing
what constitutes sound policy in a domestic setting are not easily
transportable when the questions morph from those having to do with
maximizing economic welfare within a particular set of borders to
maximizing welfare globally. No country has signed on to such a
concept as the basis for international tax rules that may lead to the
diminishing of its own revenue intake. In a coordination setting,
larger countries can and likely will act to negotiate and implement
rules that may work to their best advantage, potentially to the
disadvantage of smaller and less powerful countries, and the BEPS
project largely failed to assuage such concerns.92
The imperfect design of the BEPS project has led to a project of
international reform that has left developing countries on the sidelines. The
marginalization of those countries, particularly those in the sub-Saharan
Africa region, is of particular concern. This region consistently falls at the
bottom of most lists of economic indicators with a large component of
residents living in extreme poverty. The COVID-19 pandemic has only
pressed the region into further destitution.
According to the World Bank Group, recovery in the region will depend
on job creation and economic transformation.93 This will require digital
transformation (expansion of the digital infrastructure),94 sectoral reallocation
(a shift from raw exports to maximizing regional value chains),95 and spatial
integration.96 Advances have been observed even as the pandemic has played
out.97 Strengthening of the public health system and social protection systems
has been achieved by the leveraging of the region’s digital economies.98
92. Id. at 7 (citations omitted).
93. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECON. FOR THE AFRICAN REGION, AFRICA’S PULSE: AN ANALYSIS OF
ISSUES SHAPING AFRICA’S ECONOMIC FUTURE 68–69 (2020).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 70.
96. Id. at 117–20.
97. Id. at 51–53.
98. Id. at 4, 51–53 (“Evidence shows that at the height of the lockdown, 25 percent of the firms in
Sub-Saharan Africa accelerated the use of digital technologies and increased investments in digital
solutions in response to COVID-19.”).
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Participation of the international community will be vital to the realization of
these goals.99 This presents the occasion to consider three ways in which the
BEPS project can be reimagined to provide support to the region through tax
reform.
A. Treaty-Based Support of Regional Tax Incentives
Action Five of the BEPS Project100 relates to harmful tax practices and
builds upon the work the OECD initiated when it issued the HTCR described
above.101 It targets all harmful tax regimes and is not limited, as in the case
of the HTCR, solely to geographically mobile activities, such as financial and
other service activities, and it covers the provision of intangibles.102 Action
Five indicates a resolve not to consider global tax design in the introduction,
when the preamble notes that the initiative is “not intended to promote the
harmonisation of income taxes or tax structures generally within or outisde
the OECD.”103 While the report does not purport to “dictat[e] to any country
what should be the appropriate level of tax rates,”104 it has the effect of
countenancing the competitive moves of many developed countries
(including, most recently, the United States) to compete by lowering tax rates
in their separate regimes to attract foreign investment.105
A trend among developed countries strapped for revenue after the 2008
recession was the lowering of corporate income tax rates to attract
multinationals.106 While Ireland was the first mover in the 1990s to a 12.5%
maximum corporate income tax rate when most others were at 30% or higher,
other countries have countered with their own rate reductions.107 The United
Kingdom, Japan, Canada, and others have reduced their top statutory tax rates

99. Id. at 6.
100. See ACTION 5 FINAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 15–16.
101. See id. at 11–12.
102. See id. at 11.
103. See id. at 11.
104. See id. at 11.
105. See id. at 12 (“Countries have long recognised that a ‘race to the bottom’ would ultimately
drive applicable tax rates on certain sources of income to zero for all countries, whether or not this is
the tax policy a country wishes to pursue . . . .”).
106. Karen B. Brown, Taxation and Development: Overview, in TAXATION & DEVELOPMENT—A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 3–16 (Karen B. Brown ed., 2017).
107. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES
2 (2017).
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in recent years and the United States moved at the end of 2017 to a 21% flat
tax rate, down from the 35% maximum rate.108 This type of competition for
investment does not violate Action Five principles because it classifies a tax
regime as “harmful preferential” only if the rate reduction applies only to
particular activities, often known as “ring-fenced” regimes. A rate much
lower than that existing in other countries is not harmful under BEPS, so long
as it applies generally to all corporate income.109
This definition of harmful tax regime sanctioned the competitive
strategies of developed countries, but it does not address one of the major
issues facing developing countries—the ability to offer tax incentives to
foreign investors. The G20 Development Working Group, the OECD
component charged with engaging with developing country issues, noted that
while the topic was outside of the BEPS mandate, the use of tax incentives
was a top concern for these nations.110
Rate competition by the developed world forecloses any chance that
developing countries can set corporate income tax rates high (or high enough)
because multinational companies, committed to reducing the tax cost of doing
business, will force rates downward as the price for investment.111 A
developing country may respond to this pressure by offering a “tax holiday”
to attract a given business activity of a multinational.112 Recognition of this
effect of the “spillover” from the tax regimes of developed countries led
authors of a recent study to recommend allocation of taxing rights to
developing countries through source or other rules.113 Yet the Action Five
Report condemns a practice of ring-fencing, of which a tax holiday is an
example, as unfairly competitive, but provides little alternative for developing
countries.
108. See id. at 1, 18, 21, 37.
109. UK’s Patent Box is a ring-fenced regime, but it was recently blessed by the OECD.
110. See DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP PART 1, supra note 51, at 14.
111. See id.
112. See, e.g., id.; Kangave, supra note 40, at 283.
113. INT’L MONETARY FUND, IMF POLICY PAPER: SPILLOVERS IN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE
TAXATION 11–12 (2014), https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/050914.pdf [hereinafter IMF
POLICY PAPER]. The IMF defines a spillover as “the impact that one jurisdiction’s tax rules or
practices has on others.” Id. at 12. It notes the special importance of allocation of the rights to tax
income to low-income countries as source countries and the “recipients of capital inflows,” but not
investors in business activities outside their borders. Id. Because developed countries, as capital
exporters, maintain the right to tax their resident multinationals, this may operate to the detriment of
developing countries because developed countries are not concerned with the “fair” international
allocation of tax revenue and powers across countries. Id. at 11.
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The move of many high-income countries to a territorial tax regime
(featuring tax exemption for specified income from foreign business
operations) offers an incentive to their resident multinationals to seek tax
holidays. If a multinational enterprise’s country of residence allows a
participation exemption, resulting in nontaxation or very light taxation of
earnings derived from operations abroad through a wholly-owned subsidiary,
lower rates in the developing country will be attractive. The United States,
for example, enacted a dividends-received deduction (allowing a deduction
for 100% of dividends received from a controlled foreign corporation), an
effective exemption of U.S. taxation on certain foreign source business
income.114 That exemption is allowed independently of any governing
standards. Consequently, a U.S. multinational could negotiate rock-bottom
tax rates for income from investments in sub-Saharan Africa without little
requirement to provide significant benefits to the country of investment. A
new U.S. tax, known as global intangible low-tax income (GILTI) is designed
to offset the incentive to go offshore for low-tax income, but it may be
subverted, and only works to the benefit of the U.S. Treasury. It provides no
incentive to invest in sub-Saharan Africa.115
Without standards, the investment may be free of local taxation and fail
to connect the benefits of tax-free operations with attainment of sustainability
goals by the host location. While the OECD drafted a set of policies and
objectives concerning tax incentives, these have not been made an official part
of Action Five.116 To support the ability of developing countries to attract
much-needed foreign investment through carefully tailored tax incentives, this
article proposes that the Multilateral Instrument to Implement Tax Treaty
Related Matters to Prevent BEPS be amended to incorporate guidelines for
these investments as informed by the SDGs.
These would include best practices as to the design of the incentives as
well as requirements for standards such as job creation, gender equity in the
workplace, partnerships for infrastructure projects concerning roads, utilities,
and housing, as well as for environmental protections. These guidelines could
also serve as a template for members of the OECD, as well as other countries
114. 26 U.S.C. § 245A (2018).
115. 26 U.S.C. § 250 (2017). An incentive would exist if the dividends received deduction were
available only for investment in sub-Saharan Africa. See 26 U.S.C. § 243 (2018). In its present form,
the exemption works as an incentive to invest elsewhere if the rate is low and other non-tax incentives
exist. See IMF POLICY PAPER, supra note 113, at 20–21.
116. Id.
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that enter into tax incentive agreements with sub-Saharan African nations.
Negotiation of agreements in accordance with the guidelines either through
the Multilateral Treaty or through one-on-one or regional treaties could be
rewarded and publicized by maintenance of a publicly available list. Unlike
the black-lists that were used to characterize the developing country as a bad
actor when the HTCR was launched, this list would commend the country
incorporating the standards into their treaties as well as the multinationals that
partner with the developing country as good actors that are advancing the path
toward achievement of these important goals.
B. Assist in Capacity Building
As mentioned in Part I, developing countries may lack the capacity to
implement many of the complex BEPS proposals. An example is the
enactment and enforcement of the transfer pricing proposals that span four
reports. Transfer pricing in a multinational group of companies offers the
possibility that income is shifting among members to minimize tax liability.
Developing countries may fall victim to pricing tax avoidance schemes if they
lack the tools to detect them and the ability to bring audits to conclusion.117
The BEPS reports detail a range of methodologies that require application and
implementation by a tax administration that has the statutory support as well
as the manpower to audit and assess complicated corporate transactions.
Simplification of the standards will allow sub-Saharan countries to employ
these standards to raise revenue. The proposal is twofold.
First, the recommendation is that the OECD devote resources to
developing alternatives that may be readily applied by developing nations.
The goal is to achieve a workable methodology readily instituted by the lowincome, resource-strapped country.118 Second, the recommendation is that the
high-income countries develop a fund to assist in sub-Saharan nations to train,
recruit, and effectively employ a solid tax administration.119 This would
117. See generally World Bank Confirms Economic Downturn, supra note 16.
118. See Afton Titus, Domestic Revenue Mobilization Through Corporate Income Tax in an African
Developing Country Context, DALHOUSIE L.J. (forthcoming 2021).
119. See Ben Dickinson, Building Tax Systems in Developing Countries Is Vital to Overcoming
COVID-19 and Achieving the SDGs, OECD (July 9, 2020), https://oecd-developmentmatters.org/2020/7/09/building-tax-systems-in-developing-countries-is-vital-to-overcoming-covid19-and-achieving-the-sdgs/; Building Capacity to Prevent Profit Shifting by Large Companies in
Zambia, OECD TAX & DEVELOPMENT CASE STUDY (2020), https://www.oecd.org/countries/
zambia/building-capacity-to-prevent-profit-shifting-by-large-companies-in-zambia.pdf.
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enable the countries to collect the income needed to build infrastructure and a
social safety network in support of SDGs. An environmentally friendly way
to build a fund would be to devote a small portion of an existing carbon tax or
to enact one. In the alternative, each OECD member could commit to
contributing an annual amount to a tax administration fund. Each member
could partner with resident multinationals that are committed to assisting the
developing world to increase administrative capacity, such as the members of
the B-Team described in the Introduction that are committed to transparency
in tax practices and to supporting effective tax administration. These
companies could undertake to provide technical expertise to tax offices in
developing countries with which they are not involved in a controversy.
C. Re-envision the BEPS Digital Economy Tax Proposals
A cornerstone development in the BEPS project addresses the twentyfirst century challenges presented by the ever-evolving digital economy.
Action One of the fifteen BEPS initiatives detailed a blueprint for targeting a
type of tax-avoidance made possible by the failure of traditional tax doctrine
to capture unique aspects of the profit-making capacity of online sales and
services.120 In particular, longstanding treaty rules concerning jurisdictional
limitations left governments unable to tax where the online business lacked a
physical presence, termed a “fixed place of business,” within a State’s
confines. The OECD response is a two-pillar approach.
Pillar One addresses the case of a digital business with no physical
presence in a country (or only a distribution or marketing function) in a
country.121 The impetus for the proposal is the recent enactment by countries,
like France, of a digital services tax and is aimed at reaching an international
consensus. The resulting formulaic approach deemed necessary to establish
a new taxing right over residual profits allocated to market jurisdictions is
incredibly hard to implement (introducing three separate tax amounts
determined under super-challenging transfer pricing rules) and may involve
overlapping jurisdiction or multiple taxation of profits requiring a robust
dispute resolution mechanism. Finding the Pillar One “Unified Approach” a
120. See Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, Action 1: 2015 Final Report,
OECD (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241046-en.
121. Secretariat Proposal for a “Unified Approach” under Pillar One, OECD (2019),
https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultation-document-secretariat-proposal-unified-approachpillar-one.pdf.
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challenge to the administrative capacity of developing countries, a drafting
group of developing country members of the U.N. Tax Committee has
proposed an alternative, known as Article 12A, that permits withholding of
automated digital services income on a gross basis, or an option for a simpler
mechanism for net basis taxation, known as Article 12B.122
This article’s third reform proposal is that the OECD pause its work to
seriously consider and, possibly, redirect its path to take into account the U.N.
Tax Committee’s drafting group alternative approach. The BEPS project will
fail to achieve legitimacy if it does not take into account the important
obstacles to adoption and implementation of the proposals, particularly the
digital services initiatives, in sub-Saharan Africa. Many countries in that
region are considering a digital services tax, not because it will raise
significant revenue, but because they feel they must be participants in the
global reform conversation launched by the OECD.123 While the revenue
gains will inure to the benefit of high-income countries, sub-Saharan nations
are pressured to play along if only to provide a measure of legitimacy to their
own systems.124 Failure to re-envision the digital services proposals means
that sub-Saharan Africa will not derive benefit from current tax reform.
Pillar Two, which continues to be developed, advances the case for the
imposition of a Global Anti-Base Erosion tax, or “GloBE” to reach certain
profits from digital access to consumer markets.125 This proposal is designed
to insure that large multinational enterprises pay a minimum level of tax
regardless of where they are headquartered or operated. A main feature is an
income inclusion rule to apply whenever a multinational corporation is taxed

122. David E. Spencer, Taxation of the Digital Economy: Proposal by the UN Tax Committee, 31
J. INT’L TAXATION 30 (Nov. 2020) (noting the work of the Drafting Group of Developing Country
Members of the U.N. Tax Committee, a significant minority of the members of the Committee, to
counter the OECD’s “Unified Approach” under Pillar One, and their particular concerns, including
the complexity of the proposal, problems of implementation, administration, and coherence with
developing country legal systems, and ability to obtain information necessary to enforce the proposed
allocation of taxing rights).
123. See Nana Ama Sarfo, Digital Taxation in Africa: Safety in Numbers?, TAX NOTES INT’L (Sept.
4, 2020), https://www.taxnotes.com/featured-analysis/digital-taxation-africa-safety-numbers/2020/
09/04/2cxds.
124. Id. (noting the view of the African Tax Administration Forum that “[w]hile the revenue raised
would not be large for most African countries . . . a [digital services tax] could improve public
confidence in the fairness of the tax system”).
125. Global Anti-Base Erosion Proposal (“GloBE”)—Pillar Two, OECD (2019), https://www.
oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultation-document-global-anti-base-erosion-proposal-pillar-two.pdf.
pdf.
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below a minimum effective tax rate. The rule would result in an income
inclusion at the controlled foreign corporation’s parent level in order to top up
the rate.
The Biden administration’s endorsement of the GloBE proposal provides
a separate opportunity to shape tax reform in a direction that is meaningful for
sub-Saharan Africa.126 Proper tailoring of a global minimum tax, adopted
with an international consensus that includes this region, holds promise for
worldwide coordination of tax rates and harmonization of tax bases in a way
that will accord agency to sub-Saharan Africa as it constructs revenue-raising
strategies that will support a blueprint for emergence from the pandemic.
III. CONCLUSION
The ability of sub-Saharan countries to mobilize sufficient revenue to
sustain infrastructure and a social network and to achieve economic growth is
critical to the achievement of the 2030 sustainable development goals to
which all U.N. members committed in 2015.127 Reconfiguration of the BEPS
Project to consider the structural problems underlying the international tax
system by questioning the fundamental principles built into existing regimes
of high-income countries could have assisted in uncovering impediments to
achieving these goals. A multilateral approach to reform, involving
developing countries in conceiving the project, would have brought
developing country issues to the forefront.
A global tax system administered by some form of a World Tax
Organization held the promise to bring all players to the table in a bid to
equitably allocate taxing rights among all jurisdictions. A common corporate
tax base, like that proposed but not adopted by the European Union, would
have diminished national borders and afforded the prospect of a cooperative
approach to international taxation. The lack of political will for such an
approach set up the BEPS Project for controversy and, perhaps, ultimate
rejection of some components. It ensured that the significant problems faced
by sub-Saharan Africa and other developing nations in their bid to mobilize
adequate revenue to support a sustainable future would not be adequately
addressed. Yet, it is not too late to accord a major role to sub-Saharan Africa

126. The Made in America Tax Plan, US DEP’T TREASURY 10–12 (Apr. 2021),
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/MadeInAmericaTaxPlan_Report.pdf.
127. Valderrama et al., supra note 47, at 4–5.
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in the direction of further BEPS reforms. Recent proposals involving digital
services tax reforms, particularly the GloBE, if re-envisioned with input from
that region, hold promise to restore legitimacy to the OECD/G-20-led tax
reform effort.
Implementation of a number of the other supports
recommended above may operate to secure the position of sub-Saharan
Africa, as well as to maximize worldwide welfare.
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